Pinkas, Issue in Multicast Security: A Taxonomy and Efficient Constructions, Infocom’ 99, pp. Franklin, An Efficient Public Key Traitor Scheme, Advances in Cryptology-Crypto’ 99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. Meadows, Security of Ramp Schemes, Advances in Cryptology-Crypto’ 84, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol.196, pp. Stinson, Generalized Beimel-Chor Schemes for Broadcast Encryption and Interactive Key Distribution, Theoretical Computer Science, vol. Cresti, Space Requirements for Broadcast Encryption, Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt’ 94, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. Berkovits, How to Broadcast a Secret, Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt’ 91, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. ![]() of the 11-th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2000), pp. Sgall, Efficient Dynamic Traitor Tracing, Proc. Matsumoto, A Quick Group Key Distribution Scheme with Entity Revocation, Advances in Cryptology-Asiacrypt’ 99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. Spencer, The Probabilistic Method, John Wiley, (2nd Edition), 2000. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. We provide a motivating scenario in which the assumption does not hold and, for both problems, we review and extend some existing broadcast encryption schemes, in order to gain fault tolerance and to remove the need for trust in the broadcaster. This issue has not previously been addressed in the broadcast transmission setting. The second aspect concerns with the assumption that the broadcaster, who receives information for broadcasting from several entities, must be trusted. The first is a well-studied issue in communication over unreliable channels: packets can get lost and some redundancy is required to provide reliable communication. In this paper we deal with two aspects of secure broadcast transmission: reliability and trust in the broadcaster. Usually, the broadcast message contains a fresh session key, which can subsequently be used for secure broadcast transmission to the priviliged set of recipients. Later on, it broadcasts an encrypted message along a broadcast channel, in such a way that only users in a priviliged subset can decrypt it, by using the pre-defined keys received in set-up phase. In a set-up phase, the server gives pre-defined keys to every user of the system, using secure point-to-point channels. ![]() A broadcast encryption scheme enables a server to broadcast information in a secure way over an insecure channel to an arbitrary subset of priviliged recipients.
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